Hey gang. Wanted your help working through something I keep thinking about.
The common refrain from (mostly) R's is "the Biden Administration isn't doing enough" to help Ukraine. Now, maybe it's all the Churchill comparisons flying around, but I keep having the same thought about the current moment:
This looks a lot like Lend-Lease.
I know. WW2 comparisons are dumb. But isn't there a little bit of similarity to American policy during the Blitz? A European ally getting bombarded, thousands of dead civilians, a president hamstrung by isolationists at home, but providing a blank check of material support.
Am I crazy, or is Biden's current Ukraine policy kinda like Lend-Lease? Is that good or bad? Will it take a Pearl Harbor type event to escalate American involvement? Help me out here.
Also, Spades is the unofficial card game of the Marine Corps. I learned how to play it in juvi as a teen and it came in handy in country. Ran x3 Bostons my last tour. Very underrated game.
Another big tell in the casualty counts are the Russian KIA:WIA ratios, which appear to be around 1:2 right now. By comparison, US casualty rates throughout GWOT were around 1:7-8. This is because we strapped insane amounts of personal body armor to every guy/gal outside the wire (x4 E-SAPI plates) and then kept our combat units dismounted for the most part save for insert/exfils in some cases (logistical convoys are the exception, but they're not combat units).
The point is: BMPs and T-72s are ATGM/IED-magnets, and if the Russian military spends most of its time relying on motorized armor for force protection, they will continue to see their guys get burnt alive inside of scrap vehicles at a rate of 2-8 guys per ATGM. That's where the rate of change comes from: multiple personnel kills per effective ATGM deployed. When you dismount your infantry they can't be effectively targeted by ATGMs, or certainly not as easily when they're all sitting inside of an APC. The enemy has to rely on using small arms fire to take out dispersed ground patrols, which gets a lot more dicey than firing off an ATGM and then dipping out. Bullets go both ways and artillery fire can be called in if within range. The biggest tactical error Russia is making right now is keeping a lot of their guys inside of armored vehicles that are more vulnerable than had the conscripts simply gotten out and patrolled instead of sitting inside of a BMP-2 or Tigr. You can survive bullet wounds taken on patrol. You *cannot* survive a catastrophic ATGM hit on an armored troop transport or an Mi-24 shootdown using MANPADs.
I read a quote from a DOD briefer yesterday that most of these deaths are concentrated in Russia's combat-ready forces, not in combat support forces, so the deaths are particularly devastating to Russia's ability to initiate offensive action in the future.
Already, combat support troops are being placed in to combat roles they aren't trained for. That will probably make it even easier for Ukrainian troops to kill them.
Before the invasion happened, I made the comment to my wife that Putin's grievance isn't with the West, it's with objective reality in the 21st Century. The Russian leadership's unwillingness to accept inconvenient facts is destroying their stature in the world, perhaps permanently.
Let us hope Ukrainian civilian casualties never approach those numbers in Iraq.
No one knows with certainty how many people have been killed and wounded in Iraq since the 2003 United States invasion. However, we know that between 184,382 and 207,156 civilians have died from direct war related violence caused by the U.S., its allies, the Iraqi military and police, and opposition forces from the time of the invasion through October 2019. The violent deaths of Iraqi civilians have occurred through aerial bombing, shelling, gunshots, suicide attacks, and fires started by bombing. Many civilians have also been injured.
Advertising my lack of military knowledge in advance, I have a question concerning Russia's desire to conquer certain cities. In the past, when we fought with more primitive weapons, most building structures would be left intact, even if all the inhabitants were killed. Additionally, the control of significant cities meant controlling supply lines, transportation hubs, manufacturing facilities, and centralized communication centers. Most of these factors are no longer valid. In addition, with modern high explosive munitinitins, there is little left of the city after it has been conquered. When I see pictures (which I guess are accurate) of cities pounded into piles of rubble, I wonder the point of trying to capture this city that no longer exists. Other than the psychological benefit of attempting to demoralize the enemy, all I see is the firming of Ukrainian resolve to resist Russian advances. Also, the Ukrainians know the consequences of being taken prisoner by the Russians, which is another reason for fierce resistance. From a military perspective, wouldn't it make more sense to go around a city, blockade it, destroy any airfields, and offer good terms to anyone who surrenders? I see the Ukrainians doing something similar to what the Russians did to Germany in WWII. Retreat, leave a wasteland behind, and stretch the enemy's supply lines to the breaking point. Not exactly the same, but similarities are enough to make wonder what is passing for military strategy in the minds of the Russian high command?
Amen to drones & intel. If the Ukrainians can take out the howitzers and MLRS launchers that are devastating the civilian population then Putin loses much of his ability to inflict terror.
For once I think I can agree with JVL, about the use of Drones. All the chatter about getting cold war age MIGS in the air for Ukraine would solve the problem is a crock. There is NO way a 40 year old plane would be any match for today's technology. The drones and an improved anti aircraft missle systems would serve Ukraine much better.
In any war, there are mistakes made by either side at the outset that either get corrected over time or lead to a protracted front where casualty-aversion is the name of the game. This is the nature of how both sides grow their "veteranship" over time as they learn what tactics work and which ones will get your whole unit murdered. Mariupol will be a big turning point because once it is taken it will do some big things for Russian field commanders:
It will demonstrate the effectiveness of the "use artillery barrages to inflict casualties while minimizing friendly losses" model that will no doubt be adopted in other urban sieges around the country once it has proven its effectiveness in the south. This is how commanders learn and adapt from the successes of their counterparts.
The other big thing it will do for Russian commanders is open up more logistical resources. With Mariupol leveled and leftover resistance there slim, Chechens and other veteran units that Russia has in Mariupol can be recommitted to taking Odessa or consolidating the eastern Oblasts.
Finally, we need to look at who the Russians can loop in. They're already tapping Syrian and now Libyan troops (Run Marty!), but word on the block is that there is a real chance of Belarus getting pulled into a conflict it is already ankle-deep in. If Belarus commits its military to the Russian cause, that's like several new northern fronts opening up just north of Kyiv. If this occurs, the map looks a lot different. Same thing if the Russians continue to employ the "more artillery, fewer casualties" model across the north. The Russian military is already offering Mariupol the same thing it had previously offered cities like Idlib & Grozny: "Capitulate and cease all resistance now or see the city you are defending reduced to ruble."
The Ukrainians can resist these tactics, but absent intervention by US/UK/France (NATO won't do it), expect to see that Russian casualty rate to go down while the civilian casualty rates goes way up.
JVL, the drone news is even better than you indicate, as it turns out that the 100 Switchblade systems being provided is actually 1000 drones, as each system comes with 10 munitions. 1000 drones is a good start, but hopefully the US continues supplying them. These could be a game changer. https://twitter.com/michaeldweiss/status/1504399671632048128
We hear a lot about the RU generals who are killed. How much does the number of officers killed in that KIA number play a role?
Also, is there any suggestion that Ukrainian forces are actually targeting those officers rather that the officers just being too close?
Hey gang. Wanted your help working through something I keep thinking about.
The common refrain from (mostly) R's is "the Biden Administration isn't doing enough" to help Ukraine. Now, maybe it's all the Churchill comparisons flying around, but I keep having the same thought about the current moment:
This looks a lot like Lend-Lease.
I know. WW2 comparisons are dumb. But isn't there a little bit of similarity to American policy during the Blitz? A European ally getting bombarded, thousands of dead civilians, a president hamstrung by isolationists at home, but providing a blank check of material support.
Am I crazy, or is Biden's current Ukraine policy kinda like Lend-Lease? Is that good or bad? Will it take a Pearl Harbor type event to escalate American involvement? Help me out here.
Also, Spades is the unofficial card game of the Marine Corps. I learned how to play it in juvi as a teen and it came in handy in country. Ran x3 Bostons my last tour. Very underrated game.
Another big tell in the casualty counts are the Russian KIA:WIA ratios, which appear to be around 1:2 right now. By comparison, US casualty rates throughout GWOT were around 1:7-8. This is because we strapped insane amounts of personal body armor to every guy/gal outside the wire (x4 E-SAPI plates) and then kept our combat units dismounted for the most part save for insert/exfils in some cases (logistical convoys are the exception, but they're not combat units).
The point is: BMPs and T-72s are ATGM/IED-magnets, and if the Russian military spends most of its time relying on motorized armor for force protection, they will continue to see their guys get burnt alive inside of scrap vehicles at a rate of 2-8 guys per ATGM. That's where the rate of change comes from: multiple personnel kills per effective ATGM deployed. When you dismount your infantry they can't be effectively targeted by ATGMs, or certainly not as easily when they're all sitting inside of an APC. The enemy has to rely on using small arms fire to take out dispersed ground patrols, which gets a lot more dicey than firing off an ATGM and then dipping out. Bullets go both ways and artillery fire can be called in if within range. The biggest tactical error Russia is making right now is keeping a lot of their guys inside of armored vehicles that are more vulnerable than had the conscripts simply gotten out and patrolled instead of sitting inside of a BMP-2 or Tigr. You can survive bullet wounds taken on patrol. You *cannot* survive a catastrophic ATGM hit on an armored troop transport or an Mi-24 shootdown using MANPADs.
RE: Russian soldier deaths . . .
I read a quote from a DOD briefer yesterday that most of these deaths are concentrated in Russia's combat-ready forces, not in combat support forces, so the deaths are particularly devastating to Russia's ability to initiate offensive action in the future.
Already, combat support troops are being placed in to combat roles they aren't trained for. That will probably make it even easier for Ukrainian troops to kill them.
Before the invasion happened, I made the comment to my wife that Putin's grievance isn't with the West, it's with objective reality in the 21st Century. The Russian leadership's unwillingness to accept inconvenient facts is destroying their stature in the world, perhaps permanently.
Let us hope Ukrainian civilian casualties never approach those numbers in Iraq.
No one knows with certainty how many people have been killed and wounded in Iraq since the 2003 United States invasion. However, we know that between 184,382 and 207,156 civilians have died from direct war related violence caused by the U.S., its allies, the Iraqi military and police, and opposition forces from the time of the invasion through October 2019. The violent deaths of Iraqi civilians have occurred through aerial bombing, shelling, gunshots, suicide attacks, and fires started by bombing. Many civilians have also been injured.
And Syria--- and Yemen.
FYI. Each switchblade unit contains 10 drones. That’s effectively 1000 guided missiles. (Sorry. Missed the earlier comment)
Advertising my lack of military knowledge in advance, I have a question concerning Russia's desire to conquer certain cities. In the past, when we fought with more primitive weapons, most building structures would be left intact, even if all the inhabitants were killed. Additionally, the control of significant cities meant controlling supply lines, transportation hubs, manufacturing facilities, and centralized communication centers. Most of these factors are no longer valid. In addition, with modern high explosive munitinitins, there is little left of the city after it has been conquered. When I see pictures (which I guess are accurate) of cities pounded into piles of rubble, I wonder the point of trying to capture this city that no longer exists. Other than the psychological benefit of attempting to demoralize the enemy, all I see is the firming of Ukrainian resolve to resist Russian advances. Also, the Ukrainians know the consequences of being taken prisoner by the Russians, which is another reason for fierce resistance. From a military perspective, wouldn't it make more sense to go around a city, blockade it, destroy any airfields, and offer good terms to anyone who surrenders? I see the Ukrainians doing something similar to what the Russians did to Germany in WWII. Retreat, leave a wasteland behind, and stretch the enemy's supply lines to the breaking point. Not exactly the same, but similarities are enough to make wonder what is passing for military strategy in the minds of the Russian high command?
Dude. This Spades article rules.
Amen to drones & intel. If the Ukrainians can take out the howitzers and MLRS launchers that are devastating the civilian population then Putin loses much of his ability to inflict terror.
The Spades piece is amazing - don't miss it. (Thanks, as always, for pointing us to all kinds of interesting writing out there in the world, JVL!)
For once I think I can agree with JVL, about the use of Drones. All the chatter about getting cold war age MIGS in the air for Ukraine would solve the problem is a crock. There is NO way a 40 year old plane would be any match for today's technology. The drones and an improved anti aircraft missle systems would serve Ukraine much better.
The flip side to the Russian loss equation:
In any war, there are mistakes made by either side at the outset that either get corrected over time or lead to a protracted front where casualty-aversion is the name of the game. This is the nature of how both sides grow their "veteranship" over time as they learn what tactics work and which ones will get your whole unit murdered. Mariupol will be a big turning point because once it is taken it will do some big things for Russian field commanders:
It will demonstrate the effectiveness of the "use artillery barrages to inflict casualties while minimizing friendly losses" model that will no doubt be adopted in other urban sieges around the country once it has proven its effectiveness in the south. This is how commanders learn and adapt from the successes of their counterparts.
The other big thing it will do for Russian commanders is open up more logistical resources. With Mariupol leveled and leftover resistance there slim, Chechens and other veteran units that Russia has in Mariupol can be recommitted to taking Odessa or consolidating the eastern Oblasts.
Finally, we need to look at who the Russians can loop in. They're already tapping Syrian and now Libyan troops (Run Marty!), but word on the block is that there is a real chance of Belarus getting pulled into a conflict it is already ankle-deep in. If Belarus commits its military to the Russian cause, that's like several new northern fronts opening up just north of Kyiv. If this occurs, the map looks a lot different. Same thing if the Russians continue to employ the "more artillery, fewer casualties" model across the north. The Russian military is already offering Mariupol the same thing it had previously offered cities like Idlib & Grozny: "Capitulate and cease all resistance now or see the city you are defending reduced to ruble."
The Ukrainians can resist these tactics, but absent intervention by US/UK/France (NATO won't do it), expect to see that Russian casualty rate to go down while the civilian casualty rates goes way up.
JVL, the drone news is even better than you indicate, as it turns out that the 100 Switchblade systems being provided is actually 1000 drones, as each system comes with 10 munitions. 1000 drones is a good start, but hopefully the US continues supplying them. These could be a game changer. https://twitter.com/michaeldweiss/status/1504399671632048128